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I. INTRODUCTION: IS OPEN SOURCE LICENSING OF
PATENTS A SOLUTION TO DRUG COSTS AND ACCESS?
The high cost of medicines and resulting lack of access to
many of these treatments represent some of the most troubling
issues of our time and are the subject of much attention both in
the developedand the developingworld.1 There can be no
doubt that biomedical science continues to make breakthroughs
in the treatment of many diseases. Indeed, in the last twentyfive years, treatments for chronic conditions such as HIV
infection, diabetes, and cardiovascular disease have been
developed and widely adopted by health care providers.2 Yet,
globally—and even within the U.S.—these pharmaceutical
treatments are not always available to or utilized by those who
need them because of their high costs.3
Patents have been widely identified as being at least one of

1. See, e.g., Diane V. Havlir & Scott M. Hammer, Patents Versus
Patients? Antiretroviral Therapy in India, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 749 passim
(2005); Mary Moran, A Breakthrough in R&D for Neglected Diseases: New
Ways to Get the Drugs We Need, 2 PLOS MED. 0828, 0828 (2005); Yochai
Benkler, Commons-Based Strategies and the Problems of Patents, 305 SCIENCE
1110 passim (2004); Bernard Pécoul, New Drugs for Neglected Diseases: From
Pipeline to Patients, 1 PLOS MED. 019, 019 (2004); Patrice Trouiller et al.,
Drug Development for Neglected Diseases: A Deficient Market and a PublicHealth Policy Failure, 359 LANCET 2188, 218891 (2002).
2. J.D. Kleinke, The Price of Progress: Prescription Drugs in the Health
Care Market, HEALTH AFF., Sept.Oct. 2001, at 43.
3. See, e.g., Stephanie Saul, In Sour Economy, Some Scale Back on
Medications, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2008, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/22/business/22drug.html; John D. Piette et
al., Cost-Related Medication Underuse Among Chronically Ill Adults: The
Treatments People Forgo, How Often, and Who is at Risk, 94 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1782 passim (2004).

MARDEN LF CHECK.WEB (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

3/9/2010 11:43 AM

OPEN SOURCE DRUG DEVELOPMENT

219

the causes of the problem.4 Patents give their owners a legal
monopoly and grant a right to exclude others from use of an
invention. As such, the patent holder can charge a fee for a
license to use the patent. The pharmaceutical industry
generally characterizes these amounts charged as reasonable,
in light of very large research and development costs.5 The
argument is that intellectual property (IP), in the form of
patents, provides the incentive to invest in the risk-laden drug
development business. 6
Others maintain that the financial benefit reaped by
pharmaceuticals is out of proportion with the cost to society as
a whole in terms of high prices and lack of access to health care
innovations.7 They further question the notion that patents are
necessary for innovation.8
For some, the solution to this impasse is a change to the
way IP rights—and patent rights in particular—are exercised.
In particular, it is now increasingly common to point to open
source, modeled on non-proprietary models used in the
computer software arena, as a mode of IP practice that can at
once make IP more widely accessible and by implication can
lower the costs of drugs. In her 2008 book, Biobazaar, Janet
Hope effectively sets the bar for this discussion:
A key premise of this book is that open source principles of technology
development, licensing, and commercial exploitation offer at least a
partial solution to the innovation lock-down caused by extensive
private control over scientific and technological information within a

4. See, e.g., Stephen M. Maurer et al., Finding Cures for Tropical
Diseases: Is Open Source an Answer?, 1 PLOS MED. 183, 183 (2004); see also
John E. Sulston, Chair, Inst. for Sci., Ethics and Innovation, Who Owns
Science (May 19, 2009) (see http://www.terry.ubc.ca/index.php/2009/04/30/whoowns-science-sir-john-sulston-on-may-19th); Jean O. Lanjouw, Patents, Price
Controls, and Access to New Drugs: How Policy Affects Global Market Entry
passim (The National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Patent No.
11321, 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11321.
5. Henry Grabowski, Patents, Innovation and Access to New
Pharmaceuticals, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 849 (2002).
6. See, e.g., Lila Feisee, Biotech. Indus. Org.’s Dir. for Fed. Gov’t
Relations & Intellectual Prop., Anything Under the Sun Made by Man (April
11, 2001), available at http://www.bio.org/speeches/speeches/041101.asp
(pointing to, for instance, the explosion of the biotechnology industry following
the Supreme Court’s decision in Diamond v. Chakrobarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980),
which declared that genetically engineered bacteria were patentable, as
evidence of the power of patents to stimulate innovation).
7. See MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL
MONOPOLY 21314 (2008).
8. Id. at 215.

MARDEN LF CHECK.WEB (DO NOT DELETE)

220

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

3/9/2010 11:43 AM

[Vol. 11:1

highly concentrated industry structure.9

There are those who take the concept further and have
proposed an open source approach in biology as a means toward
ongoing access to knowledge that results in less costly, more
widely available health care products. Thus, for example,
Stephen M. Maurer and his colleagues propose an open source
system in which “volunteers [would] use a variety of computer
programs, databases and computing hardware” to share ideas
that have not been patented and hence to develop lower cost
pharmaceutical products.10 Maurer and his colleagues go on to
promise that “open-source drug discovery is feasible” and invite
scientists to make the model work explicitly, in this case, for
developing drugs for tropical diseases.11 Kathleen M. NolanStevaux argues similarly that an open source approach to
biology is the best incentive—versus other IP alternatives—to
stimulate drug development with the aim of improving access
in the developing world.12 The aim, again, is to embrace an
alternative to conventional patent rights to allow
simultaneously (1) a model of contribution and open
participation in innovation and (2) an approach to drug
development that does not allow for the monopoly rents
imposed by patent exclusivity.13
There have been some efforts in this area. In the context of
neglected tropical diseases, the Tropical Disease Initiative
(TDI)14 focuses its efforts on coordinating charities to create
nonprofit venture-capital firms in the guise of “Virtual
Pharmas” to search out and develop promising treatments.15
The TDI intends to play the role of a “kernel” in this process
and provides a platform for scientists from laboratories,
universities, institutes, and corporations to collaborate in order

9. JANET HOPE, BIOBAZAAR: THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION AND
BIOTECHNOLOGY 20 (2008).
10. Maurer et al., supra note 4, at 185.
11. Id.
12. Katherine M. Nolan-Stevaux, Open Source Biology: A Means to
Address the Access & Research Gaps, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L. J. 271 (2007).
13. Id.
14. Tropical Disease Initiative, http://tropicaldisease.org/ (last visited Oct.
20, 2009).
15. Maurer et al., supra note 4, at 183.
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to find new drugs to treat neglected tropical diseases.16 The
idea is that all knowledge is shared and not patented and that
contracts will be awarded by TDI at some point to put the
drugs through the clinical testing process.
In addition, Open Source Drug Discovery (OSDD) is funded
by the Government of India to provide an open source platform
for aggregating scientific knowledge in order to discover drugs
to treat diseases that are prevalent in the developing world
with the aim of providing affordable healthcare to people
around the world, particularly in developing countries.17These
emerging platforms reflect the growing interest in open source
as an alternative intellectual property mechanism that may
ensure greater openness and access to information.
By the admission of all, these efforts represent first steps
and open source drug development remains unproven as a
strategy to reduce drug costs and to increase access. The aim of
this article is to take the discussion of open source and drug
development a step further and to rigorously test the
hypothesis that has been proposed, namely that an open source
drug development process offers a potentially realistic solution
to the drug cost and accessibility issues. Toward this end, the
present article asks what open source drug development would
look like and whether it is likely to yield success on its own
dual criteria of enabling ongoing innovation and increasing
access of end products. This discussion draws on a rigorous
analysis of the drug development process as well as the
technical details of licensing patents on an open source basis.
Overall, the article concludes that open source is not a
viable option for drug development if drug development is
understood as being the process of moving a molecule, pathway,
or process past drug discovery through to the approval of a

16. Id.
17. Open
Source
Drug
Discovery,
What
is
OSDD,
http://www.osdd.net/what-is-osdd (last visited Oct. 20, 2009) [hereinafter
OSDD]. The government of India has committed $32 million to the OSDD
project and released $8.2 million. Much like the TDI, students, scientists,
researchers, academics, institutions, and corporations from around the world
may become partners in OSDD, where they can contribute to and synthesize
available knowledge in order to discover new drugs. New molecular entities
(NMEs) will not be patented, but instead will put into the public domain. With
the aid of the Government of India or philanthropic funding, the development
of drugs is to be outsourced to contract research organizations and other
private industry partners. Id.
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drug or diagnostic by regulatory authorities.18 It is indisputable
that open source operates elegantly in the information
technology context and has produced a number of widely used
programs, even while preserving access to the underlying
source code. Moreover, it is likely that in the drug discovery
context and in very early development stages open source could
succeed at keeping certain underlying intellectual property
open and available for further innovation. As discussed below,
however, it is not clear that full-scale open source drug
development can yield less costly and more accessible drugs.
Patent rights differ markedly from copyrights and the efforts
that must be undertaken to make open source workable for
drug compounds are difficult and expensive. Even if
intersecting patent rights could be resolved, the legal and
regulatory requirements of drug development make that
process expensive and resource-heavy, whether or not open
source plays a part in the process. Given all this, it cannot be
maintained that an open source drug development system
offers a better alternative than other models that have been
proposed.
This article begins in Part II with a review of the origin of
open source in the copyright context of the information
technology arena. It then examines in detail how open source
might operate with respect to patents, the form of intellectual
property generally used for compounds in drug development.19
In so doing, it points to two aims that have been identified for
using open source with respect to patents: (1) to preserve access

18. See University of California, San Francisco, School of Pharmacy
Glossary, http://pharmacy.ucsf.edu/glossary/d/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2009)
(defining “drug development” and “drug discovery”). “Drug discovery” refers to
the research process that identifies molecules with desired biological effects
and selects them as having promise as new therapeutic drugs in humans.
19. The public discussion of open source for drug development variously
refers to open source genomics and open source biotechnology. Biotechnology
is an industry that commercializes biological compounds. Genomics, in turn,
characterizes a broad field of study, comprised of anything having to do with
the genome. As such, it also characterizes biological compounds. The goal of
this article is to examine the potential use of open source for active compounds
that might be patented and used in drug development; these could be derived
from the study of genomics or could be chemical compounds. For this reason,
this article refers to compounds used in drug development, with the
understanding that this could describe a range of types of materials.
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to the information,20 thus fostering the possibility of an open
system of innovation and ongoing fruitfulness of research,21
and (2) to yield products that are less costly and more
accessible.22 In order to test the open source concept in drug
development, the article goes on to present a detailed overview
of what is entailed in that process following the discovery stage,
right through to clinical trials, approval and post-marketing
obligations.23 This article then turns, in Part III, to the topic of
what an open source drug development process might be, how
open source licensing provisions might play out, and how
development could be undertaken even in the absence of a large
pharmaceutical company sponsor.
Part IV examines the question: would use of an open
source licensed compound in the drug development process
likely meet the complementary goals of preserving access to the
fundamental innovation and yielding a product that is more
accessible and less expensive? A further issue considered is
whether public or private enterprises would want to engage
open source drug development, given the potential impacts. In
reaching findings on these issues, the article concludes in Part
V with suggestions of other alternatives that offer potentially
more viable options for reigning in the costs of drug
development and resulting prices for pharmaceutical products.
II. OPEN SOURCE: BACKGROUND AND OPERATION
A. HISTORY OF OPEN SOURCE: ROOTS IN INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY/SOFTWARE
Open source—and its precursor in the information
technology community, GNU—was developed in response to the
commercial software industry’s IP practices.24 As a general
principle, software is primarily written in code which, as a

20. Although the fundamental rationale underlying patents is that the
owners are granted a limited monopoly in return for making their discoveries
public, in practice the intellectual property system does provide a degree of
control over information and can be said to limit access.
21. See, e.g., HOPE, supra note 9, at 15154.
22. See, e.g., BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 7, at 22526.
23. See University of California, San Francisco, School of Pharmacy
Glossary, supra note 18 (discussing stages of drug discovery).
24. FREE SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY: SELECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M.
STALLMAN 15768 (Joshua Gay ed., 2002) [hereinafter STALLMAN: SELECTED
ESSAYS].
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written form, is subject to IP coverage by copyright. A copyright
allows the holder to prevent others from copying, distributing,
or adapting the code.25 The common practice in
commercializing software is to require users to agree to a
license before use, which bars the user from sharing or copying
the software.26
For a number of software innovators, the growing
commercialization of software posed a barrier to ongoing
innovation because it forced users to agree to a license for use
and barred them from seeing or altering source code. The free
software and open source movements grew out frustration with
the practice of closing off programs as they developed, even to
those who participated in their development at earlier stages.27
Richard Stallman, and later Linus Torvalds (Linux), developed
operating systems that would leverage the contributions of
many while leaving the source code open to any and all
contributors. Stallman termed his approach, “GNU” (which
stands for “Gnu’s Not Unix”, a recursive acronym).28 The Linux
operating system, which was first released by Torvalds,
represented a further development of GNU and became
emblematic of the movement. Torvalds’s approach became
known as “open source,” because of the availability of the
source code.29
Developers of the free software movement designed a
copyright license which could help share programs and
maintain open access to source code: this is the so-called
General Public License (GPL) or “copyleft.”30 The GPL was

25. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
26. Paul Goodman, Shrink Wrap License Agreements: Unravelling Some of
the Confusing Legal Issues, 9 MACTECH (1993), available at
http://www.mactech.com/articles/mactech/Vol.09/09.03/Shrinkwrap/index.htm.
27. STALLMAN: SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 24, at 15768; see also Free
Software Foundation, http://www.fsf.org (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
28. Richard Stallman, The GNU Operating System and the Free Software
Movement, in OPEN SOURCES: VOICES FROM THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION
23
(1st
ed.
1999),
available
at
http://oreilly.com/catalog/opensources/book/copyright.html.
29. See id. at 53. It is worth noting that the nomenclature and distinctions
between these movements remains an issue of some debate. Richard Stallman,
for example, is firmly against using “open source” as a description of a
movement that includes GNU. Id.
30. SAM WILLIAMS, FREE AS IN FREEDOM: RICHARD STALLMAN’S CRUSADE
FOR FREE SOFTWARE 128 (2002).
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deemed necessary, because copyrights are otherwise selfexecuting.31 That is, just by writing a software program, it is
deemed copyrighted; no further action is needed on the part of
the programmer and a user is obligated not to copy the source
code.32 The GPL is an affirmative rejection of this right. It
publicly states that the source code is not copyrighted and is
instead available to copy, change and freely distribute (thus the
name “copyleft”).33 The GPL is said to be viral because the
license obligation applies to each subsequent licensee.34
Collectively, these developments became known as open
source, though there are a number of variant approaches.35 As
developed in the Linux context, supporters of the open source
movement also believe that the more people working on a
particular problem (or software design), the better.36 The
philosophy is that the greatest possible non-hierarchical
collaboration can maximize the potential value and the
potential benefit of a new idea. Thus, work is generally
structured in a non-hierarchicalor bazaar-likemanner with
the prototypical example of principle in action being the
development of the Linux operating system. The number and
abilities of programmers working on the product are not limited
to those that exist within the boundaries of a single firm but
rather include a diffuse network.37
In the software sector, this novel approach has provided a
successful platform for researchers and commercial enterprise.
The internet, for example, relies on massive numbers of Linux

31. See id. at 12223.
32. Id.
33. Free Software Foundation, GNU General Public License (version 3,
June 29, 2007), http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html [hereinafter GNU GPL].
34. Id.
35. Richard Stallman, President, Free Software Found., Lecture at the
University of British Columbia: Free Software in Ethics and in Practice (Feb.
6, 2009) [hereinafter Stallman lecture]. There are disputes amongst the
progenitors of these movements as to the correct terminology and whether
“free software” is indeed synonymous with “open source.” Rather than
weighing in on this discussion, I adopt the term “open source” to refer to the
free and open source code that was the hallmark of the movement.
36. See Jae Yun Moon & Lee Sproull, Essence of Distrubted Work: The
Case of the Linux Kernel, in DISTRIBUTED WORK 381-404 (Pamela Hinds &
Sara Kiesler eds., 2002).
37. ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON
LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY 41 (1st ed.
1999).
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servers (for Google, among other things).38 Other open source
based software companies have achieved financial success by:
(1) selling a convenient package of products, some of which may
be freely available, (2) consulting to other software companies,
or (3) providing technical support for the program.39 While the
software may be available elsewhere for free, users
(particularly non-programmers) may prefer to buy a product
they trust from a source that strives to serve their needs.
According to one commentator, IBM Corporation likely makes
twice as much profit from its support of open source software
(Linux based products) than from regularly licensed products.40
B. OPEN SOURCE IN THE BIOTECHNOLOGY SECTOR
The aim of devising an open source approach for
biotechnology and specifically drug development is similarly to
create a system that will allow contributors and users greater
freedom to use innovation in productive, more inclusive ways.
As described by Janet Hope in her book, Biobazaar: The Open
Source Revolution and Biotechnology:
Open source . . . is an attempt to renegotiate [the relationships in IP]
based on (1) a reframing of intellectual property as a means of
facilitating, rather than hindering, the production of knowledge as a
public good and (2) the gradual transformation of biotechnology
research and development practices toward the production of more
convivial [user oriented, available] tools.41

Just as open source software was a reaction to the
restrictions placed on programmers and users by proprietary
practices in that sphere, the open source movement in
biotechnology has arisen largely in response to concerns about
the implications of patent use. In the biotechnology arena,
these concerns include questions about the implications of

38. Amanda McPherson, Linux is Everywhere (Now in the Air), LINUX
FOUND., AMANDA’S BLOG (August 28, 2007, 6:07 AM),
http://www.linuxfoundation.org/node/2426.
39. Examples of other open-source-based software companies are Apache
HTTP Server, osCommerce, and Mozilla Firefox.
40. John Newton, Professional Open Source Software, JOHN NEWTON’S
THOUGHTS, IDEAS AND OPINIONS ON CONTENT MANAGEMENT, ENTERPRISE
SOFTWARE
AND
OPEN
SOURCE,
July
29,
2009,
http://newton.typepad.com/content/2009/07/professional-open-sourcesoftware.html
41. HOPE, supra note 9, at 329.
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ownership of biological materials42 for the practice of science,43
and for research and access to ultimate end health care
products.44
Nonetheless, application of the open source approach to
biotechnology is not a simple matter. There are important
differences between software and health care products that
make the transfer of the model complex as outlined briefly in
the table on page 228.

42. With respect to IP, questions have long been raised about the ethics of
allowing ownership of genetic material. See, e.g., LORI ANDREWS & DOROTHY
NELKIN, BODY BAZAAR: THE MARKET FOR HUMAN TISSUE IN THE
BIOTECHNOLOGY AGE passim (2001) (acknowledging concerns about the ethics
of patenting). These concerns continue. See, e.g., John Conley, The ACLU v.
Myriad Genetics Suit: Legitimate Challenge or Publicity Stunt?, GENOMICS L.
REP.
(June
4,
2009),
http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2009/06/04/aclu-v-myriadgenetics-suit-legitimate-challenge-or-publicity-stunt/. The IP and ethics issue
is an important one; however, it is not the focus on the present article.
43. See, e.g., JOHN SULSTON & GEORGINA FERRY, THE COMMON THREAD:
A STORY OF SCIENCE, POLITICS, ETHICS, AND THE HUMAN GENOME (2002)
(recounting the importance of open source in projects such as the Human
Genome Project); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses,
Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE
ECONOMY 119, 121 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2000).
44. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998);
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and Data-Sharing in Public Science, 15 INDUS.
& CORP. CHANGE 1013 (2006); Robert Cook-Deegan & Tom Dedeurwaerdere,
The Science Commons in Life Science Research: Structure, Function and Value
of Access to Genetic Diversity, 58 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 299 (1996).
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Table 1: IP Practices: Software v. Biotechnology
Software

Biotechnology

Predominant Form of
IP protection

Copyright

Patent

Development
Timeline

Short with high
turnover

Long

Need for
equipment/laboratory
space

Low

High

Regulatory review
and oversight

Low

High

Product Granularity

Low

High

The most significant difference is that the former is written
in code and is thus generally protected by copyright, while the
latter is generally characterized by empirical scientific work
and concomitant insights and is thus subject to patent
protection (with the exception of bioinformatics and related
disciplines). The differences between copyright and patent are
significant. Copyright attaches to work automatically (and is
thus cheap to obtain) and prevents copying of written code or
text.45 A copyright in a work lasts for up to 70 years (depending
on the jurisdiction) and there is little maintainence cost,
though enforcement can be expensive.46
Patents, in contrast, are granted to inventions that meet
requisite subject matter conditions as well as standards of
utility, non-obviousness, and novelty.47 Patents are expensive
to obtain and have significant maintenance costs (not to
mention high enforcement costs). Patents essentially provide
the patent holder with the right to exclude others from

45. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101122 (2006).
46. 17 U.S.C. §§ 301305 (2006).
47. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101103 (2006).
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practicing the invention.48 The relationship between copyright
and patents is something like the relationship between a cake
recipe and the cake one can make. The copyright essentially
prevents others from copying the recipe itself; the patent gives
the holder the right to prevent others from making the cake for
commercial distribution.
Software and biotechnology further differ in terms of the
development time of products as a general principle. As a gross
generalization, software can be developed rather quickly and
generally has a short market turnover with improved versions
and competitor products emerging quickly. There is no
government approval requirement for such products and they
can be placed on the market rapidly. In contrast, biomedical
products—the end result of biotechnology research—require
long development times and lengthy government regulatory
review with ongoing oversight.49 Additionally, the stereotypical
software development process requires little more than
computer technology and human innovators, while
biotechnology generally requires expensive specialized
equipment, laboratory space, and access to biological substrates
and various research tools, all of which are subject to rigorous
codes and audit by regulatory authorities.50
A final difference exists in the need for product
granularity. For software, there is no limitation on the nature
and number of changes that can be made to the product as it is
developed and even subsequent to market entry. In contrast,
the significant regulatory requirements faced by biomedical
products mean that a single product must be frozen at the
stage of development in which it enters the regulatory process;
any changes made thereafter could result in redoing earlier
development stages and thus cause significant delays. This
issue is discussed in more detail later.
Proponents of open source in biotechnology have taken the
position that these differences are not limiting and that open
source can be successfully applied in this area.51 Just as in

48. ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT AND PATENT LAW 564 (2d
ed. 2004).
49. See infra Part III.
50. See infra Part III.
51. See HOPE, supra note 9, at 189 (“. . . I argue in this chapter and the
next that none of the differences between software and biotechnology
constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to implementing an open source
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software, open source in biotechnology is not intended as a
rejection of IP per se. Rather, the aim is to control IP to achieve
the goal of maximum production of knowledge and to ensure
that knowledge remains open and available even once modified.
As described by its proponents, open source in
biotechnology starts with IPin this case a patent or
patentson relevant material. The intent is that the patented
material can then be licensed on open source terms: nonexclusively and (generally) royalty free. Often an open source
license will also include a viral clause, analogous to the GPL or
copyleft provision in open source software, that obligates
licensees to share improvements or modifications on similar
open source terms. The aim is to insert future controls in order
to ensure that the open source objectives continue to be met.52
There can also be an obligation to “grant-back” to the licensor
on open source terms, any improvements to the licensed
technology.53 For example, in the CAMBIA BiOS License for
Genetic Resources Indexing Technologies, Version 1.3 (BiOS
GRIT), there is an obligation for licensees to share all
“improvements” with BiOS to be further licensed on similarly
open source terms. 54 The idea there is that the original licensor
would become a repository of all knowledge relating to the
originally licensed technology and would ensure that all such
knowledge was then available to licenseeswith the aim of
maximum possible knowledge production.55

‘biobazaar.’”).
52. In this sense, it is arguable that open source licensing is a form of
defensive patenting.
53. See, e.g., The CAMBIA BiOS License for Genetic Resources Indexing
Technologies
(version
1.3),
http://www.bios.net/daisy/GRITLicense/750/1170.html (last visited Oct. 27,
2009) [hereinafter BiOS GRIT]. In some ways, the obligation to grant back
rights is in opposition to the philosophy of open source. However, as used here,
the notion is to heighten knowledge sharing potential by ensure that licensors
and licensees freely benefit from all knowledge related to the patented
information.
54. Id. § 3.
55. Some, e.g., Janet Hope maintain that the CAMBIA BiOS license is not
truly open source because of the control being in the hands of CAMBIA. See,
e.g., Janet Hope, Open source genetics: a conceptual framework in GENE
PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS PATENT POOLS,
CLEARINGHOUSES, OPEN SOURCE MODELS AND LIABILITY REGIMES 19192
(Geertrui Van Overwalle, ed., 2009); see also Dianne Nicol and Janet Hope,
Cooperative Strategies for Facilitating Use of Patented Inventions in
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Putting such licenses into practice has proven to be far
from simple, especially for any license that aims to apply as
open source licensed quantities are developed into commercial
drug products. Key questions include: what happens to open
source information once licensed? Can a licensee make
improvements and then patent that information? Can a
licensee patent innovations derived from open source material?
Is there an obligation to share improvements with the licensor
or other licensees? And fundamentally, what happens to open
source licensed material as you move downstream to
commercial products? Is there any incentive for participation in
such a system? These questions for open source in the
commercial drug development context are examined in greater
details below.
C. OPEN SOURCE BIOTECHNOLOGY IN PRACTICE?
There are a few examples of groups attempting to put open
source biotechnology into an applied context.56 Possibly the
most well known is the BiOS initiative of CAMBIA, an
Australian nonprofit which is dedicated to making genomics
resources widely available, particularly in the agricultural
sector. 57 In essence, BIOS is intended to operate as a repository
for patented information in a few fields, including, for example,
“genetic resources indexing technologies.”58 A party developing
such a technology chooses to license the technology, molecule or
substance to BiOS for purposes of making the technology
accessible. BiOS then takes on the responsibility of licensing
these materials on open source terms to all comers on certain
terms, deemed by BiOS to promote openness and access.
The BiOS model has not been fully tested in a commercial
context, however, and it is not clear whether it presents an
acceptable alternative for developers of applied products. For
example, among other things, the BiOS GRIT that is currently
available states that the open source terms of that agreement
override any other contract or license held and bars the licensee
Biotechnology,” 24 LAW IN CONTEXT 85, 107 (2006) (not disputing the accuracy
of this comment, but rather pointing to the CAMBIA license as an illustration
of an open source-like approach).
56. Janet Hope explores these examples as well as a number of others in
BioBazaar. HOPE, supra note 9, at 30918.
57. See BiOS Home Page, http://www.bios.net/daisy/bios/home.html (last
visited Oct. 27, 2009).
58. Id.
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from entering into contracts with conflicting terms.59 Such a
term may appear the most direct way of ensuring that open
source terms survive subsequent contractual relationship.
Conceptually, however, it has the potential to make ongoing
development relationships very difficult for the BiOS licensee.
Other efforts are also underway, though for the most part
these focus on drug discovery effort, which are relatively free
from complex licensing arrangements. For example the Open
Source Drug Discovery60 (OSDD) organization, established
recently in India, endeavors to establish an open source
genomic community aimed at leveraging individual efforts in
drug discovery for certain identified projects to increase access
to outputs. Like BiOS, OSDD offers itself as a repository for
material given by researchers who have an interest in
advancing access to innovations and therefore agree to OSDD’s
terms in submitting their materials to it. Among other things,
the OSDD license agreement obligates contributors to share
their innovations with OSDD, as well as any improvements on
that innovation.61 In informal conversations, OSDD has stated
that it intends to use the materials in its database to advance
drug discovery and development. However, as of yet, there is no
indication as to how this would proceed.
The fundamental question of this article is whether an
open source drug development pathway is a viable option.
Toward that end, I first review in some detail the scientific and
regulatory steps required in drug development. Thereafter, I
evaluate the potential of open source in this process.
III. DRUG DEVELOPMENT
Drug development refers to the processes involved in
taking a candidate drug or biologic62 through the stages

59. BiOS GRIT, supra note 53, § 3.4.
60. OSDD, supra note 17.
61. Open Source Drug Discovery TWiki Registration Terms and
Conditions
§
3.2
(Proprietary
Rights),
http://sysborgtb.osdd.net/bin/view/TWiki/TWikiRegistration (last visited Oct.
20, 2009).
62. U.S. statutory law distinguishes between a drug (“intended for use in
the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease.” 25 U.S.C.
§ 321 (2006)) and a biologic (“any virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin,
vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product or analogous
product applicable . . . to the prevention, treatment or cure of disease.” 42
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necessary to obtain marketing approval. The process begins
with the pre-clinical studies required to show sufficient safety
to enter into the clinical process of human testing. In general,
the end goal of drug development is to have a product that is
approved by relevant regulatory authorities and can be
prescribed to or otherwise made available to patients.
Joseph A. DiMasi and his colleagues at Tufts University
have demonstrated that the drug development process is
lengthy and expensive.63 There is much debate to just how
expensive the process is: Merrell Goozner and Marcia Angell
have attacked drug industry accounts that the cost of
development for a drug is around $800 million dollars,
suggesting that this figure includes heftyand perhaps
unjustifiedamounts for marketing and promotional budgets.64
This high estimate reflects the fact that successful (or even
unsuccessful) drug development, starting from an early stage of
research and development, requires consideration and strategy
on a wide range of factors including, inter alia:
-identification of the disease indication65 to be treated,

U.S.C. § 262(i) (2006))these definitions are intended to distinguish between
small molecule products and large molecular entities produced in living cells.
In the U.S., drugs and biologics are generally approved under distinct, though
analogous, regulatory pathways and by different divisions of FDA (i.e. the
Center for Drug Evaluation and Review (CDER) versus the Center for
Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER) (with some limited exceptions)).
For purposes of this article, the term “drug” is used to include drugs and
biologics.
63. See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of
Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 152 (2003).
64. MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW
THEY DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004); MERRIL GOOZNER, THE
$800 MILLION PILL: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE COST OF NEW DRUGS (2004).
65. Drugs are approved for particular “indications,” which denote the
conditions or diseases they are intended to treat; usually the “indication” for a
drug is very narrow, so a drug will be approved not for the treatment of
cancer, or even for cancer in a particular organ such as the bladder. Instead it
will be approved for a certain type of bladder cancer, and often for a particular
stage and sub-type of cancer and treatment priority such as a “second-line
treatment for stage 3 superficial bladder cancer.” As far the drug regulatory
authorities (Health Canada or FDA) are concerned, once approved for any
particular indication, a drug may generally be used, on the judgment of the
prescriber, for any condition whatsoever. That is, the health authorities do not
regulate the practice of medicine; they are the gatekeepers for letting drugs
into the market. Physicians are constrained in their use of drugs “off-label” by
their own assessments of drug safety and efficacy, plus very important
considerations of liability and reimbursement.
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-potential for adverse events,
-intellectual property landscape,
-regulatory requirements and hurdles,
-the ability to conduct research and trials in a
regulatory compliant manner,
-potential
to
manufacture
and
deliver
the
drug/compound,
-willingness of payors to pay for the end product, and
-the potential market for the product.
It is worth noting that the high figure includes opportunity
costs as well as the costs of both successful and unsuccessful
candidates, and not just those entities that come out of
research and development and are successfully developed into
commercial products. The latter is significant since even after
years of preclinical study, 75-80% of drugs that begin clinical
trials do not make it through to be approved products.66
Many dispute the high estimates given for drug
development costs,67 arguing that pharmaceutical companies
fold in marketing and other administrative costs in order to
create the perception that high R&D costs justify high prices
for end products.68 For the present discussion, it is not material
whether the cost is $50 million or $800 million per novel
candidate; the point is that the process is, in absolute terms,
expensive and the risks of failure are high. The various steps in
the process are described below.
A. DEMONSTRATING SAFETY AND EFFICACY: PRE-CLINICAL AND
CLINICAL TRIALS
Once a candidate is selected for development, the goal is to
meet the regulatory requirements so that a marketing
authorization will be granted. As a general rule regulators
require a sponsor to demonstrate that a proposed drug (or

66. See, e.g., DiMasi et al., supra note 63, at 165 (“Our statistical analysis
of compounds in the Tufts CSDD database of investigational drugs that met
study criteria yielded a predicted final clinical success rate of 21.5%.”).
67. See, e.g., ANGELL, supra note 64; GOOZNER, supra note 64.
68. See, e.g., ANGELL, supra note 64. Christopher P. Adams & Van V.
Brantner, Estimating The Cost Of New Drug Development: Is It Really $802
Million?, 25 HEALTH AFF. 420 (2006) (stating that some variation in cost of
development is due to the firm’s strategic choice).
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biologic) is safe and efficacious and that the benefits of the drug
(or biologic) outweigh the risks at the specified dose and for the
specified indication.69 These overarching standards, as well as
the specific clinical trials required, are harmonized to a degree
amongst international regulatory authorities including the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the U.S., the European
Medicines Agency (EMEA), and other worldwide bodies. In fact,
these countries collectively participate in the International
Conference on Harmonization (ICH) which directs its focus on
making “recommendations on ways to achieve greater
harmonization in the interpretation and application of
technical guidelines and requirements for product registration
in order to reduce or obviate the need to duplicate the testing
carried out during the research and development of new
medicines.”70
The following diagram, taken from the FDA website, gives
an overview of the process as implemented in the U.S. 71 The
red arrows refer to variations on the approval route that may
be used when there is an identified unmet medical need or
there is pressure to allow the drug for use, even while it is
being studied. These variations have specific requirements and
are only applicable in limited situations.

69. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2006).
70. International
Conference
on
Harmonization
of
Technical
Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use,
http://www.ich.org/cache/compo/276-254-1.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2009)
(“The International Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements
for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH) brings together the
regulatory authorities of Europe, Japan and the United States and experts
from the pharmaceutical industry in the three regions to discuss scientific and
technical aspects of product registration.”) [hereinafter ICH]. This article
discusses the FDA requirements while acknowledging that similar
requirements exitss for approval in Canada, the European Union, Japan,
Australia, and a number of other developed countries.
71. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,
THE
CDER
HANDBOOK
4
(1998),
available
at
http://druganddevicelaw.net/CDER_handbook.pdf
(CDER
Handbook
is
currently under revision; non-revised version provided by source outside of
FDA); see also Jim Beck & Mark Herrmann, FDA’s CDER Handbook –
Undergoing Revision, DRUG AND DEVICE LAW (Aug. 14, 2009, 11:42AM),
http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2009/08/fdas-cder-handbookundergoing-revision.html [hereinafter CDER Handbook].
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Diagram 1: The New Drug Development Process:
Steps from Test Tube to New Drug Application Review

Drug development generally begins after a target molecule,
process, or pathway has been identified.72 As in the above
chart, the first step in drug development is to conduct a barrage
of standard pre-clinical studies on the identified molecule in an
effort to provide baseline evidence that it is safe and efficacious;
this work is a precursor to putting the molecule into human
beings.73
Preclinical testing is undertaken to evaluate the drug’s
toxic and pharmacologic effects through in vitro and in vivo
laboratory animal testing.74 As a part of this process,

72. See generally ULF MADSEN & TOMMY LILJEFORS, TEXTBOOK OF DRUG
DESIGN AND DISCOVERY 134 (2002) (overviewing basic drug design and
discovery).
73. 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2009).
74. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, INVESTIGATORS, AND REVIEWERS: EXPLORATORY
IND
STUDIES
2
(2006),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformat
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genotoxicity screening is performed. In addition, researchers
undertake investigations on drug absorption and metabolism,
the toxicity of the drug’s metabolites, and the speed with which
the drug and its metabolites are excreted from the body.75 At
the preclinical stage, the FDA will generally ask, at a
minimum, that sponsors: (1) develop a pharmacological profile
of the drug, (2) determine the acute toxicity of the drug in at
least two species of animals, and (3) conduct short-term toxicity
studies ranging from two weeks to three months, depending on
the proposed duration of use of the substance in the proposed
clinical studies.76 All of this work must be done according to
stringent Good Laboratory Practices (GLP), which require
meticulous control and recording of every aspect of processes
employed.77 The GLP standards differ materially from controls
and procedures that would be ordinarily practiced in a research
institution. Thus, research carried out first in a university
laboratory generally has to be repeated in GLP facilities to be
acceptable for regulatory submissions. Many companies
contract their preclinical work out to specialized companies
that undertake these kinds of trials for a fee.
With sufficient preclinical data evidencing the safety of the
molecule, sponsors can move forward toward undertaking
clinical trials. In order to initiate this process and prior to being
allowed to begin any trials in human beings, the sponsor will
need to file an “Investigational New Drug” (IND) application or
the equivalent.78 The IND is aimed at demonstrating to
regulators that the sponsor has satisfactorily conducted
sufficient pre-clinical investigations to suggest that the drug
will be safe and potentially effective in humans.79 Generally, at

ion/Guidances/ucm078933.pdf [hereinafter FDA IND Guidance].
75. Id. at 11.
76. FDA, Small Business Assistance: Frequently Asked Questions on
Drug Development and Investigational New Drug Applications,
Investigational New Drug Application: What are the FDA Requirements for
Pre-Clinical
Studies?,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/SmallBusinessAssista
nce/ucm069898.htm (last visited Dec. 9, 2009).
77. Id.; see 21 C.F.R. § 58 (2009).
78. 21 C.F.R. § 312.1(a) (2009).
79. FDA,
Investigational
New
Drug
(IND)
Application,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelop
edandApproved/ApprovalApplications/InvestigationalNewDrugINDApplicatio
n/default.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2009) [hereinafter FDA IND Application
website].
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this stage the sponsor will meet with the regulator to discuss
the information that is available or being developed about the
molecule, process, or pathway and address questions that
might be raised.
If there are no objections to the IND within a specified
period (thirty days in the U.S.),80 the sponsor will then initiate
the procession of clinical trials. The trials are typically
conducted, per regulatory directives, in four phases:
- Phase 1: The drug is tested in a few healthy volunteers
(generally less than a hundred) to determine if it is
acutely toxic and to obtain basic safety data, dosage,
pharmacology data, etc.
- Phase 2: Various doses of the drug are tried in a small
number of individuals with the targeted disease or
condition to determine basic efficacy data and to collect
additional safety data.
- Phase 3: The drug is typically tested in multiple
comparative,
double-blind
controlled
trials
to
demonstrate that the product is safe and effective for its
intended use. Sponsors typically confer with the FDA
prior to starting these Phase 3 trials to determine what
data is needed, since these trials often involve hundreds
of patients and are very expensive.
- Phase 4: These are post-approval trials that are
sometimes a condition attached by the FDA to the
approval.81
All trials must be conducted according to Good Clinical
Practices (GCP), which are rules promulgated by regulators
and designed to ensure that research is conducted in a
transparent and reliable manner.82 The GCP obligations are
80. 21 C.F.R. § 312.40(c)(1) (2009).
81. Lewis J. Smith, Types of Clinical Studies, in DRUG AND BIOLOGICAL
DEVELOPMENT: FROM MOLECULE TO PRODUCT AND BEYOND 107, 10722
(Ronald P. Evens ed., 2007).
82. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 50, 56 (2009). The International Committee on
Harmonisation defines Good Clinical Practice as a “standard for the design,
conduct, performance, monitoring, auditing, recording, analyses, and reporting
of clinical trials that provides assurance that the data and reported results are
credible and accurate, and that the rights, integrity, and confidentiality of
trial subjects are protected.” ICH, ICH HARMONIZED TRIPARTITE GUIDANCE:
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significant and pose an additional hurdle to organizations
involved in this process. GCPs require attention to a range of
factors including informed consent, record-keeping, design of
trials, safety assessments, trial monitoring, financing, and
other relevant considerations.83 Furthermore, everything done
under GCP is subject to audit.84
It is important to recognize that carrying out clinical trials
requires significant and varied expertise at each new stage.
Phase 1 trials (also known as “first in human”) trials are
“[i]nitial studies to determine the metabolism and
pharmacologic actions of drugs in humans, the side effects
associated with increasing doses, and to gain early evidence of
effectiveness.”85 They “may include healthy participants and/or
patients,”86 and often must be carried out in special units that
have the capacity to monitor and respond to dosing responses
very quickly.87 Phase 2 trials primarily assess relevant dosing
but also offer first indications of efficacy as well as additional
safety data.88 Phase 3—or pivotal trials—are expanded trials
undertaken after the preliminary evidence suggests that drug
effectiveness has been obtained.89 These much larger and more
expensive trials gather additional information to evaluate the

GUIDELINE FOR GOOD CLINICAL PRACTICE E6(R1) § 1.24 (1996)
http://www.ich.org/ (click “E” under the ICH logo; then click “Good Clinical
Practice” hyperlink; then click “E6(R1)” link) (last visited Oct. 20, 2009)
[hereinafter ICH Guidance]. The ICH Guideline has been adopted by the FDA.
ICH, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: E6 GOOD CLINICAL PRACTICE: CONSOLIDATED
GUIDANCE GUIDELINE FOR GOOD CLINICAL PRACTICE (1996), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM129515.
pdf (the ICH Consolidated Guidance has been adopted by the FDA as a
condensed version of the ICH Guidance) [hereinafter ICH Consolidated
Guidance]. The FDA and the EMEA recently announced that they were
undertaking a joint eighteen-month focus study on GCPs designed to ensure
that clinical trials submitted in drug marketing applications in the United
States and Europe are conducted uniformly, appropriately, and ethically. See
Press Release, Food and Drug Admin., FDA, European Medicines Agency
Launch
Good
Clinical
Practices
Initiative
(Aug.
3,
2009),
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm174983.
htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2009).
83. See, e.g., ICH Guidance, supra note 82, at §§ 46.
84. Id.
85. ClinicalTrials.gov,
Glossary
of
Clinical
Trials
Terms,
http://www.clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/info/glossary (last visited Oct. 20, 2009).
86. Id.
87. Smith, supra note 81, at 108.
88. ClinicalTrials.gov, supra note 85.
89. Id; see Smith, supra note 81, at 109.
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overall benefit-risk relationship of the drug and to provide an
adequate basis for approval and labeling.90
The number of participants, duration of trials, study
design, dosing, and many other parameters must be chosen for
each trial in accordance with the specific characteristics of the
drug, including identified potential for toxicity, potential
reactions with other drugs, absorption, metabolism and
excretion characteristics, as well as the mechanics of dosing
and potential patient adherence.91 Many of these
considerations are outlined in therapeutic area-specific
guidance documents authored by the FDA in the U.S.,92 and
analogous bodies in other jurisdictions.
All along this process, sponsors will confer with regulatory
authorities to identify unexpected results, adverse events,
potential changes to the protocol, and any other unforeseen or
significant events.93 It is additionally important to note that
once the clinical trial process begins, the sponsor becomes
increasingly bound to the specific compound and formulation
being tested. Any changes to the compound itself or the
manufacturing process need to be reported to regulators and
could, hypothetically, invalidate study results generated with a
prior or alternate version of the compound.94
Once the entire package is completed, the sponsor will
submit a New Drug Application (NDA)95 or Biologics License

90. ClinicalTrials.gov, supra note 85.
91. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH & CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS
EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY PROVIDING CLINICAL EVIDENCE OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR HUMAN
DRUG
AND
BIOLOGICAL
PRODUCTS
(May
1998),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformat
ion/Guidances/UCM078749.pdf [hereinafter FDA Drug Efficacy Guidance].
92. See,
e.g.,
FDA,
Clinical/Medical
Drug
Guidances,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidan
ces/ucm064981.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
93. FDA, The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and
Effective,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm143534.htm (last
visited Oct. 20, 2009) [hereinafter FDA Drug Review Process website].
94. Prabu Nambiar & Steven R. Koepke, CMC Sections of Regulatory
Filings and CMC Regulatory Compliance During Investigational and
Postapproval Stages, in FDA REGULATORY AFFAIRS: A GUIDE FOR
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS, MEDICAL DEVICES AND BIOLOGICS 203-06 (Douglas J.
Pisano & David Mantus eds., 2008).
95. FDA,
New
Drug
Application
(NDA),
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Application (BLA)96 (or equivalent in other jurisdictions) to the
FDA. The review time and process varies from country to
country, but will generally involve questions to the sponsor
during the review and may potentially involve the convening of
an advisory board of experts in the field to advise the regulator
on how to respond. In the U.S., review timeframes range from
six months for fast track review to ten-plus months for non
fast-track applications.97
There is no guarantee of approval, even if the regulator has
been involved throughout the development process. The
application is generally reviewed by multiple disciplines
separately,
including
pharmacology,
toxicology,
CMC
(chemistry, manufacturing, controls), and medical.98 Any of
these groups may find issues that they feel make the riskbenefit balance unacceptable. In recent years, the number of

http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelop
edandApproved/ApprovalApplications/NewDrugApplicationNDA/ (last visited
Oct. 21, 2009).
96. The Biologics License Application (BLA) is a request for permission to
introduce, or deliver for introduction, a biologic product onto the market. See
21 C.F.R. § 601.2 (2001). The BLA is regulated under 21 C.F.R §§ 600680. In
many ways, the BLA is analogous to the NDA, though the specific
requirements reflect manufacturing, safety, and efficacy issues that are
unique to biologics. FDA, Biologics License Applications (BLA) Process
(CBER),
http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/Biol
ogicsLicenseApplicationsBLAProcess/default.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2009)
[hereinafter BLA Process].
97. In the U.S., the Prescription Drug User Fee Amendments (“PDUFA”)
II (as well as subsequent PDUFA re-authorizations in 2002 and 2007) call for
the FDA to review and act on 90 percent of priority NDAs and BLAs within six
months and standard NDAs and BLAs and efficacy supplements within ten
months. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L.
No. 105115, § 112, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997) (establishing a priority review
pathway); 21 U.S.C. § 379g(l) (2009) (establishing prescription drug user fees
in order fund prescription drug review by FDA); FDA, Section A: PDUFA
Reauthorization Performance Goals and Procedures Fiscal Years 2008
Through
2012,
http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees/PrescriptionDrugUserFee/ucm1192
43.htm (visited January 17, 2010).
98. Ramzi Dagher, Deputy Div. Dir., Office of Oncology Drug Prods.
(OODP), Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), Food and Drug
Admin., The CDER Review Process, (Apr. 16, 2007). It is worth noting that
health authorities that “approve” drugs make their determinations on the
basis of scientific criteria of safety and efficacy; they do not take into
consideration the costs. Costs are generally a concern for other administrative
bodies—like the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMMS) in the
U.S.
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new drugs representing new chemical entities (NCE), as
opposed to “follow-on” or “me-too” versions of previously
existing drugs, approved by the FDA in the U.S. has declined
sharply. In 2008, there were under twenty-five such NCEs
approved by the FDA in the U.S.99 Moreover, in the wake of
Vioxx and other highly publicized safety issues, regulators have
implemented numerous additional controls—pre-approval and
post-approval—that may further limit the availability and
approval of new drugs.100
Even after approval, there are continuing monitoring
activities. As a condition of approval, regulators may require
post-marketing studies (Phase IV) to track adverse events or
safety issues of concern.101Sponsors are required to track and
report adverse events and to continually monitor and update
labels as new information is made available about the safety of
the drug.102Further, before entering the market, the sponsor
will need to interact with pricing and reimbursement
administrators in multiple countries to determine the actual
availability of the drug to patients.103Depending on the
sponsor’s aims, post-marketing will also require attention to IP
and regulatory exclusivities to ensure that monopoly rights are
not being infringed. This in itself can be a labor intensive and
costly undertaking.

99. PhRMA,
New
Medicines
Approved
in
2008,
http://www.phrma.org/files/2008Approvals.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2009).
100. Bette Hileman, FDA Moves to Improve System, CHEMICAL &
ENGINEERING NEWS,
Nov.
29,
2004
at
16-17,
available
at
http://pubs.acs.org/cen/news/8247/8247earlygov.html; see Press Release, Food
and Drug Admin., FDA, Public Health Advisory: Safety of Vioxx (May 22,
2009),
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPa
tientsandProviders/ucm106274.htm (discussing Merck’s decision to withdraw
Vioxx and the FDA’s cooperation therewith).
101. Smith, supra note 81, at 111. Note as well that the FDA Amendments
Act of 2007 (FDAAA), Pub. L. No. 110–85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007), added Risk
Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) provisions which the FDA can
impose on drugs associated with greater safety risks; see 21 U.S.C. § 355-1
(2009). These additional obligations, which can include additional distribution
controls or monitoring efforts, can be very expensive.
102. Id.
103. See Stephen F. Carroll, Discovery and Nonclinical Development, in
DRUG AND BIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT: FROM MOLECULE TO PRODUCT AND
BEYOND 84-107 (Ronald P. Evens ed., 2007).
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B. GENERICS
The generic pathway offers an abbreviated route for
completing the regulatory requirements discussed above and,
as such, is cheaper, less risky, and less burdensome to
complete.104 It is important to realize, however, that approval of
a generic version of a drug is not automatic once there is an
approved brand version of a drug. First, generic approval is
only available once relevant patent terms and exclusivities
have expired, so there is generally some period before an
application for approval of a generic can be submitted.105
Second, the FDA must individually approve generic versions of
drugs based on GLP, GCP, and GMP (Good Manufacturing
Practices) compliant evidence of bioequivalence and
bioavailability,106 as well as support for any differences
between the proposed generic version and the approved drug.107
For the clinical trial data related to the drug, the generic
applicant can rely on the brand drug’s original submission.108
Thus, generics get a “shortcut” to marketing authorization and
avoid the most failure prone aspect of drug development.
Nonetheless, generics are subject to the same regulatory
parameters
as
their
brand
counterparts.
Generic
manufacturers also have post-marketing safety reporting
obligations and are subject to similarly tight controls on

104. This discussion has merged drugs and biologics in the discussion of
drug development. Importantly however, for purposes of generics, there are
very different regulatory approval mechanisms because of the nature of the
substances themselves. It is much more straightforward to copy small
molecule drugs based on chemical formulae and conformation information.
Biologics, by their nature, are very large complex molecules and are produced
in cells rather than being synthesized. As a result, very minor variations in
production conditions can have drastic impacts on safety and efficacy. While
there is no generic pathway for biologics in the U.S. as of the writing of this
article, this may change with the passage of a health care bill by Congress in
2010.
105. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006); 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.53, 314.92,
314.94, 314.95 (2009) (detailing the general procedure for submitting
abbreviated applications).
106. See e.g., FDA, Pharmaceutical cGMPS for the 21st Century – A RiskBased Approach: Second Progress Report and Implementation Plan,
http://www.fda.gov/cder/gmp/gmp2004/GMP_Finalreport2004.htm (last visited
Oct. 22, 2009) (discussing FDA initiative focused at increasing drug product
quality through regulation).
107. 21 C.F.R. § 314.94 (2009).
108. Id.
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ingredient quality, sourcing, and other manufacturing issues.109
The net result is that while it is less burdensome to obtain
regulatory approval of a generic drug, it is still a costly process
with strict controls and follow up that must be maintained.
Generics cannot simply appear on the market; they too must be
the subject of careful preparation and planning by the
sponsoring entity.
C. PATENT TERMS AND EXCLUSIVITIES
It is worth noting the basis for drug market exclusivities.
These remain key drivers for conventional drug development
because pharmaceutical companies are able to earn a
significant return on investment during these exclusivity
periods. As explored in the next section, open source drug
development changes this equation and thus may reset the
incentive considerations.
In essence, there are two types of exclusivity: (1) that
conferred by patent and (2) that conferred by regulators—also
known as regulatory exclusivity (e.g. orphan drug) or data
exclusivity (e.g., new chemical entity).110 Patent exclusivity
reflects the IP landscape of the drug.111 For the term of the
relevant patent(s) on a drug, competitors are precluded from
using that protected information. Generally, when a drug is
approved, it or the processes used in its manufacture are
covered by a host of patents, the strongest of which may be a
“composition of matter” patent that protects the molecule
representing the active ingredient in the drug.112 As long as a
molecule is under patent protection, no one can market a copy
of the drug without infringing the patent (or being obligated to
license the IP). Critics often point to patents and the aggressive
enforcement of patent rights by pharmaceutical companies as a
leading cause of high drug prices.113
Data exclusivity deserves special mention. Data
exclusivities conferred under national regulatory regimes may
add market protection, and for that reason are highly pursued

109. 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.96, 314.98 (2009).
110. 21 U.S.C. §§ 351(j)(5)(D)(iii)-(iv), 355(j)(5)(D)(iii)-(iv) (2006); 21 C.F.R.
314.108 (2009).
111. 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2000).
112. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
113. Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 12, at 27476.
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by most pharmaceutical companies. The original intent of data
exclusivity provisions was to offer an additional incentive for
drug development to pharmaceutical companies in exchange for
a planned entry of generic versions of drugs.114 Data exclusivity
effectively bars regulators from allowing any other drug
application from relying on the data submitted and, in this
sense, blocks any abbreviated submissions during the term of
the exclusivity.115 Thus, during the term of exclusivity, no
competitor can rely on the data for a brand name drug to obtain
approval for a generic or copy of that drug. Hence, the generic
pathway is not available and approval can only be based on
submission of a full regulatory package. The two most common
forms of data exclusivity in the U.S. are five years granted for
“new chemical entities” that have never before been the subject
of an FDA approval, and three years for a new indication that
requires significant additional clinical studies.116
These data exclusivities generally run concurrently,
though can extend beyond patent terms and are awarded for
successful approval of new chemical entities or new indications
for which significant clinical studies were required. Often
times, pharmaceutical companies submit data for new
indications to get the three-year exclusivity period at a time
when their patent on a drug is close to expiration.117 The added
regulatory exclusivity effectively prolongs the period of market
exclusivity and is often referred to by critics as
“evergreening.”118

114. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,872,
28,896 (July 10, 1989); see also Frederick Tong, Note, Widening the Bottleneck
of Pharmaceutical Patent Exclusivity, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 775 (2002)
(explaining that the original intent of the Hatch-Waxman legislation was to
increase access to generic drugs).
115. During the term of data exclusivity, another party could submit an
application for the same drug (provided that patent issues are addressed), but
would have to submit a full New Drug Application because it could not rely on
any data previously submitted. When there is no data exclusivity, and patents
are addressed, the Abbreviated New Drug Application submission relies
extensively on data on file at the agency. Abbreviated New Drug Application
Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. at 28,896.
116. 21 C.F.R. § 314.108 (2009).
117. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 717, 727 (2005).
118. Robert Weissman, Victory and Betrayal: The Evergreen Patent System
of Pharmaceutical Company Tactics to Expand Patent Protections, 23
MONITOR,
June
2002,
MULTINATIONAL
http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/mm2002/062002/weissman.html
(last
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IV. OPEN SOURCE DRUG DEVELOPMENT
The regulatory requirements associated with drug
development are significant and exist without respect to the IP
context in which the development takes place. Thus, any
compound licensed under open source terms is still subject to
exactly the same regulatory requirements for market
authorization, with some minor requirements that could differ
under specific circumstances.119 Open source drug development
does differ from conventional drug development in other ways,
however.
The diagram below provides a rough outline of these
differences.
Diagram 2: Open Source Drug Development120
Pharma

Biotech/Pharma

Government
Universities
Philanthropy

Government
Universities
Philanthropy

Drug Discovery
Target
ID

Ligand
Validation

Drug Development
Pre-clinical
Studies

Clinical
Trials

Reg/Approval/
Manufacture

Free Flow
of
Knowledge

The blocks on the right side of the diagram, under the
Drug Development heading, apply to any drug development,
whether conducted using open source or any other IP approach.

visited Dec. 9, 2009).
119. There are limited ways that the IP status of a drug development
project impacts regulatory obligations. For example, if there are no patents
covering an approved drug, there will be no obligation to list patents in the socalled “Orange Book.” As such, any generic seeking to copy that drug would
not have to file patent certifications as required under 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.94(a)(12)(ii) (2009).
120. Rebecca Goulding (2009) (diagram on file with author).
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The key difference illustrated in the diagram between
conventional drug development and open source drug
development is that during the drug development process,
there may be an ongoing flow of information to the public under
an open source license. As shown above, open source licensing
allows for ongoing sharing of information to the licensor and
potentially to further licensees. With respect to drug
development, this characteristic affects not only future or
follow-on IP licensing, it also has likely impacts in terms of the
management and financing of the long term development
program. Each of these issues is explored further below.
As noted above, there are two interrelated rationales
variously offered for undertaking open source drug
development. One is that open source drug development is also
a means of promoting the free flow of patented information,
which will result in greater research freedom and more
innovation overall.121 The idea is that open source licensing
allows for a path to commercialization while keeping
information broadly available. As such, it is argued more
information will be available to others and innovation overall
can flourish.122
The other presumed goal of open source drug development
is that it will yield less expensive, and hence make drugs, more

121. HOPE, supra note 9, at 105. There are also scientific organizations
committed to this principle. For example, the BioBricks Foundation states as
one of its goals, “to develop and provide educational and scientific materials to
allow the public to use and improve existing BioBrick™ standard biological
parts, and contribute new BioBrick™ standard biological parts.” See, e.g., The
BioBricks Foundation, Our Goals, http://bbf.openwetware.org/Our_Goals.html
(last visited Oct. 22, 2009) (discussing goals of the foundation).
122. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Shifting Functional Balance of Patents
and Drug Regulation, HEALTH AFF., Sept.Oct. 2001, at 11935 for this
argument made outside of the open source context but in the drug context. She
maintains that more sharing of information, including failed studies would
allow for more innovation and better drug development overall. Id. The Food
and Drug Administration Amendment Act (FDAAA), § 801 (2007), legislates a
certain degree of sharing by requiring sponsors to post certain information
about clinical trial undertaken and clinical trial results on the public
clinicaltrials.gov website. It is arguable that this information is useful to
researchers and clinicians alike. Nonetheless, posting clinical trial results does
not per se facilitate the scope of sharing envisaged in open source licensing. As
discussed throughout this article, an open source license would allow
researchers access to use and modify any aspect of a patented compound. In
contrast, the clinicaltrials.gov disclosure has no impact on the IP status of a
compound.
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accessible.123 This line of thinking holds that if drug compounds
are not patented and licensed with the intent of creating
market monopolies, (1) it will be cheaper to license the relevant
compounds for development, thereby reducing approval costs at
the outset and reducing potential costs of the end product; and
(2) there will be more parties making the drugs, more
competition and, as a result, cheaper drugs. Inherent in this
approach is an expectation or hope that generic manufacturers
will readily enter the market if IP does not create a barrier and
that the entry of the generic manufacturers will ensure that
lower cost copies of a drug are available, with the net result of
increasing accessibility overall.124
Ultimately, this section attempts to answer critical
questions about how an open source drug development effort
would play out. This discussion considers: (1) how the OS
status of an in-licensed compound would unfold and whether
such a compound could realistically result in a drug that is, or
whose components are, available on open source terms; (2) how
an open source drug development effort could be organized
given likely cost limitations on the effort; and (3) how such an
effort would be financed in the likely absence of deep
investments by pharmaceutical companies expecting exclusive
rights to the final drug product. Although this article suggests
that the challenges to open source drug development are
significant, there are potential contexts in which it makes sense
to pursue open source further. Moreover, it may be important
to reconsider open source drug development in the context of
novel financing models. It is possible that if incentives to
initiate open source drug development were robust under these
models, at least some of the aforementioned obstacles could be
overcome.125
A. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CONSIDERATIONS
To begin to understand how open source licenses impact
drug development, this article assumes that the “key” (e.g.
composition of matter) patent underlying a drug is open source
licensed and that this open source license subjects the entire
123. Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 12, at 31016.
124. HOPE, supra note 9, at 28587.
125. This is a subject that merits more discussion and research in the
future.
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finished drug to the terms of the open source license.126 That is,
given the type of open source licensing described above (i.e.
non-exclusive, royalty-free, available to all comers), all the
elements of the final drug product would similarly be available
for licensing on a non-exclusive, royalty-free basis, and for this
reason it would be straightforward for a generic or other followon version of the drug to be manufactured.127
If the drug relied on this single open source licensed
patent, there would be no IP costs involved in in-licensing the
patent related to drug development. In that case, the terms of
the open source license on this in-licensed compound would
apply to the final product as well. Ultimately, competitors or
generic developers could license either the same in-licensed
compound or the finished drug product royalty-free to make
competing products.
At the same time, it is important to be aware that IP
related to drug development generally requires more than one
patented component. Thus, even if the active pharmaceutical
ingredient compound is licensed or available on open source
terms, it is possible that the finished drug itself could be
treated in a conventional proprietary manner. For example, if
the open source license on the drug compound allowed
improvements on the compound to be patented and
conventionally licensed, a drug developer could have an avenue
for moving a drug that is developed from open source-licensed
material into a conventional IP stream. Assume that a
compound X is licensed on open source terms to company
PHARMA. PHARMA does additional research on X and
discovers that it is potentially more effective in treatment if
ESP is added to it. It thus creates the improved version of X,
namely X-ESP. The open source license terms, under which X
was licensed, allow improvements to be separately patented
and do not obligate the patenting party to carry on with open
source license terms. PHARMA would then have effectively
removed itself from any open source obligations with regard to

126. This commentary would also apply if the drug development sponsor
owns the composition of matter patent and intends for the final drug product
to be licensed on OS terms. If there were no other licenses necessary for
development of the drug, the final product would be available for licensing on
whatever OS terms set by the sponsor. That said, if multiple patents/licenses
were necessary for development, the sponsor would still face issues with the
interaction of OS and non-OS licenses as described in this subsection.
127. See discussion infra Part V.
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X-ESP (of course, any developer of unimproved X would still be
under the open source license obligations). PHARMA could
then choose to proceed with drug development, with the
possibility of a patent on the end product.
It is also important to recognize that the relationship
between patents and drug development may be complex, and
that this complexity may stand in the way of realizing an open
source-licensed drug product. In reality, drugs do not usually
rely on a single patented compound or single license, but
instead generally depend on several—and potentially many—
patents including composition of matter, delivery systems, use,
manufacturing aspects, and others.128 A conventional (non-open
source) license for a patent generally requires the licensee to
ensure that there is no infringement of the licensed patent
when that licensed patent is combined with other IP.129
Further, there are often other terms that dictate the conditions
under which the licensed patent can be sublicensed—or
whether it can at all.130 Importantly, the conventional license
generally may be revoked if you attempt to make the licensed
patent information available non-exclusively or on terms that
are not deemed to be protective enough.131
Such terms could have implications on the cost and
128. See Generic Pharmaceuticals: Marketplace Access and Consumer
Issues Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 107th
Cong. 58 (2002) (statement of Kathleen Jaeger, President and CEO of the
Generic Pharmaceutical Association) (“[S]ince the enactment of HatchWaxman in 1984, the average number of patents filed per blockbuster has
increased five-fold—from two to an astounding ten patents per drug.”),
available at http://www.gphaonline.org/resources/2002/04/22/drug-pricing-andconsumer-costs.
129. See Eileen Smith Ewing, Research and Development Collaborations, in
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 445, 461 (Hugh B. Wellons et al. eds., 2007).
130. See generally id. at 460–62 (explaining the license process).
131. But see BiOS GRIT, supra note 53, at § 3.4 (demonstrating that some
developers of OS licenses attempt to address this potential by including terms
in those OS licenses that would override conflicting terms in other licensed
technologies or—alternatively—would invalidate the original OS license. “In
the event that BiOS LICENSEE has pre-existing obligations to third parties,
which obligations would conflict with BiOS LICENSEE’s obligations as
defined in this Agreement, BiOS LICENSEE shall not make any use of the IP
& Technology that would invoke such conflicting obligations, unless a waiver
of said conflicting obligations is obtained by BiOS LICENSEE from said third
party. . . . In the event that BiOS LICENSEE enters into an agreement the
terms of which would conflict with BiOS LICENSEE’s obligations under this
Agreement, the terms of this Agreement will prevail.”).
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accessibility of IP information for the final product, particularly
if there are multiple patents licensed for the production of a
drug and not all of those patents are on open source terms. In
that case, it would require a diligent effort to ensure that the
open source license terms can be applied to the final product,
without violating the terms of any conventional licenses. Drug
developers could well be faced with the question of whether a
non- open source licensed entity plus an open source licensed
entity can equal an open source product, or whether the nonopen source licensing provisions require that any product
combining multiple patents respect the non-open source license
terms. These are important questions and would determine
whether an open source-licensed compound, when added to
other necessary licensed information, would result in a product
that could be open source-licensed or whose components would
be licensable by others on similar non-exclusive, royalty-free
terms.
B. COST AND ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES
Putting aside the complexity of the IP inputs, the analysis
turns now to the cost and organizational requirements of drug
development. Conventionally, drugs are developed in, or under
the auspices of a pharmaceutical company that invests
significant resources and organizes the process for such a
project in the expectation that market exclusivity will allow for
some return on investment. 132 In contrast, the financial
incentives for a pharmaceutical sponsor to invest money and
resources in open source drug development are limited; there
the goal is for the final product (or all relevant IP inputs) to be
available on open source licensed terms, meaning there would
likely not, subject to the discussion in Section V infra, be an
exclusive interest in the final drug product. One result of this
different potential return is that it is likely that the sponsor of
an open source drug would want to minimize the costs of
development. Further, to the extent that open source drug
development is intended to result in less costly, more accessible
drugs, there is an additional impetus to make the development
process less expensive.
In the software sector, the bazaar model of production has

132. See, e.g., Covance: the CRO for Drug Development Services,
http://www.covance.com/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2009) (example of third party
vendor or Contract Research Organization).
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been identified as the source, not only of creativity, but also of a
lower cost, less hierarchical mode of production.133 In that
idealized model, individuals contribute their efforts from
multiple decentralized nodes, minimizing space and equipment
costs otherwise incurred by large hierarchical organizations.134
Further, in the bazaar model there is no organizational lead, a
further cost savings, and instead progress is made via the
cumulative, potentially more creative, efforts of the
participants.135
Some have proposed that an analogous approach might be
used in the drug development arena to similarly minimize costs
and maximize participation.136 Unfortunately, the potential for
implementing such a model in drug development is limited by
the very different requirements of that sector. Unlike most
software development, drug development is characterized by
significant regulatory requirements that dictate that work be
carried out in laboratories expressly designed for such efforts.
As described above, any clinical trials relevant to submission of
a NDA or BLA must be carried out according to strict,
regulatory-agency defined GCPs. Further, any preclinical work
is subject to Good Laboratory Practices (GLP) while production
of final products must conform with Good Manufacturing
Practices (GMP). Altogether, these GXPs—as they are
sometimes known—mean that any work done on drug

133. See RAYMOND, supra note 37, at 2778 (contrasting the bazaar, or
open source, method of software development with traditional forms, and
extolling the virtues of open source).
134. See HOPE, supra note 9, at 20 (“Open source development shows how
groups of volunteers can ‘collaborate on a complex economic project, sustain
that collaboration over time, and build something that they give away freely’—
technology that can ‘beat some of the largest and richest business enterprises
in the world at their own game.’”); see also OSDD, supra note 17 (noting that
incipient efforts in OS drug discovery by the Open Source Drug Discovery
Foundation rely heavily on this model for leveraging creativity while
minimizing costs).
135. See generally RAYMOND, supra note 37 (summarizing the emergence of
the OS movement in software and information technology).
136. See, e.g., Maurer et al., supra note 4, at 184 (arguing that welldesigned open-source licenses are the key to containing Virtual Pharmas’ R&D
costs.); HOPE, supra note 9, at 20 (“A key premise of this book is that open
source principles of technology, development, licensing, and commercial
exploitation offer at least a partial solution to the innovation lock-down caused
by extensive public control over scientific and technological information within
a highly concentrated industry structure.”).
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development must be carried out in appropriate facilities, by
individuals with the skills necessary to meet these
requirements, and with the proper record-keeping and
documentation undertaken.137 As a general rule, these
standards are not the norm in research laboratories and any
work carried out in non-conforming manner would likely need
to be redone for regulators to accept them.138
Further, drug development has fixed phases and targets
that must be met, generally in a sequential manner. The FDA
meets with sponsors throughout the process to determine
whether such targets—beginning with preclinical studies and
continuing with the clinical trials themselves—have been
achieved.139 This process does not lend itself to a decentralized
bazaar-like development process where multiple parties work
toward the success of an end product. Instead, the drug
development process likely proceeds best when there is a
project manager ensuring that each stage and target has been
appropriately met, and subject matter experts can guide
specific elements of the process. These individuals may include
project managers, experts in pre-clinical and clinical studies as
well as individuals knowledgeable in the regulatory process, IP,
financing, marketing and post-marketing issues.
Certain “virtual pharma” companies have found a way to
embrace a decentralized organizational structure while
maintaining the process controls necessary to meet drug
development requirements.140 The concept of “virtual pharma”
is that all the functions of a large pharmaceutical company can
be harnessed without the massive corporate structure that
those entities generally have.141 Instead, in “virtual pharma,” a
small number of experts work together to manage the process
of drug development, and hire or commission the necessary
experts in various functions as the process unfolds.142 Thus, the

137. See 21 C.F.R. pts. 210, 211 (2008) (GMPs); 21 C.F.R. pts. 50, 54, 56,
312 (2009) (GCPs); 21 C.F.R. pt. 58 (2009) (GLPs) (collectively, “GXP”).
138. For example, even work carried out outside the U.S. for submission in
a U.S. NDA must have been carried out in compliance with regulations.
139. FDA Drug Review Process website, supra note 93.
140. See Hal Broderson, Virtual Reality: The Promise and Pitfalls of Going
Virtual, 23 NATURE 1205, 1206 (2005) (“The virtual model gives management
the flexibility to tap a vast network of clinical development talent—without
actually bringing them in house.”).
141. Id.
142. Id.
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“virtual” company may be composed only of an executive
decision-maker, project manager, finance management, medical
management, scientists who know the molecule and its biology,
patent counsel and, depending on the context, one or two
others. This team would be responsible for managing the
process so that, for example, the many various necessary
functionssuch as appropriate toxicologistsmight be brought
on board as consultants during the appropriate phase of the
project and so on. The benefit is that the company can operate
in a leanand potentially costsavingmanner, but can still
ensure that all necessary functions are represented.
Ultimately, sponsors are unlikely able to achieve the
milestones and requirements of drug development in a bazaarlike model. A virtual pharma approach, however, may help
minimize organizational and process related costs of drug
development, especially in the earlier stages, while still
ensuring that any work done will meet the standards of
regulatory compliance required in the industry.
C. SUSTAINABLE FUNDING
Even if costs could be somewhat managed through a
virtual pharma model, the extensive regulatory process means
that drug development costs will still be significant and a large
source of financing needs to be available. As noted, drug
development currently rests on the expectation that market
exclusivity will allow some return on investment.
Pharmaceutical companies employ sophisticated risk analyses
to gauge the likelihood of success and the potential returns that
can be generated. Based on these analyses, the companies
invest the millions of dollars that are required to harness the
expertise, provide GXP compliant facilities, undertake the
clinical trials, and put together a viable package for regulatory
review in multiple countries.143
Without the potential market returns permitted by
exclusive market rights, it is possible that funding of the
development process would need to come from sources other
than pharmaceutical companies. The question then becomes:
who would offer similarly sustainable funding and why?

143. See generally DiMasi et al., supra note 63 (providing a statistical
analysis of the costs that go into drug development at various stages).
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The answer to this question is well beyond the scope of this
article. However, it is worth noting a few of the proposals that
have been put forward on this issue. For example, currently,
governments effectively pay for much of pharmaceutical
development by expending large amounts to purchase
pharmaceuticals at the end of the development process.144
Some argue that governments could get a better return on their
spending in this area by funding the upfront research into
pharmaceuticals, thereby gaining access to non-proprietary,
cheaper-end products.145 While there is some logical appeal to
this argument, it may be difficult for governments to risk
taxpayer money on a large outgoing expense that almost
certainly will not, in most cases, yield end products.146 Further,
casting governments in the role of funding parties and
regulators of pharmaceutical products will inevitably result in
ongoing issues of conflict of interestpotentially pitting
expensive safety regulations against the desire for less costly
development processes.
Another alternative frequently mentioned is that wellendowed foundations take on the role of funding drug
development in order to fulfill organizational objectives of
making certain types and classes of drugs more available.147
The model of public private partnerships has also been offered
as a potential approach and occupies a growing place in the
pharmaceutical development world.148
144. This is true even in the U.S. where there is no universal health care;
through the Medicare, Medicaid, Department of Defense and Veteran’s
Administration, the U.S. government actually buys a huge portion of
pharmaceutical products.
145. See HOPE, supra note 9, at 28788. In the U.S., the National Institutes
of Health and the National Cancer Institute invest large sums in research. As
a general matter, however, this investment is in research based activities and
there is little capacity in these agencies to actually take a compound through
the drug development process.
146. It is unlikely that governments will have a better success rate than
that biopharma achieves and indeed, there are many reasons to expect that
the success rate of government-run trials will be lower and the costs higher.
Government entities may have a hard time picking potential ‘winner’
candidates and, conversely, may have a hard time stopping losers, especially
when doing so will be subject to political pressures in addition to patient
advocacy pressures we have now.
147. See HOPE, supra note 9, at 288.
148. Mary Moran, The New Landscape of Neglected Disease Drug
Development, in CURING MALARIA TOGETHER: ANNUAL REPORT 2005 5,
available at http://www.mmv.org/IMG/pdf/Full_Report.pdf (providing an
example of a “public private partnership working on diseases of the developing
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These are issues that continue to be the focus of discussion
and study, and will need to be a central part of any effort to
move discussion of open source drug development forward.
V. ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF OPEN SOURCE DRUG
DEVELOPMENT
As noted earlier, proponents of open source drug
development have variously identified two aims for adopting
this approach. One is to ensure greater access to the
information inputs and outputs of drug development so that
there is greater potential for ongoing scientific exchange and
innovation. To a large extent, this seems an achievable goal. By
definition, open source licensed information is available on a
non-exclusive, royalty-free basis, often with the obligation that
any derivations or improvement on the ideas are similarly
available.
The second goal relating to end products that are less
costly and more accessible is a far greater challenge. Utilizing
open source drug development to make drugs less costly rests
on two significant presumptions: (1) that the research and
development costs related to open source drug development will
be less than that of conventional drugs, lowering costs that are
passed on to purchasers; and (2) that greater competition
resulting from the absence of monopoly rights will drive prices
down. This section examines this goal further and concludes
that neither of these claims will always be true for open source
drug development and thus it is not clear that open source drug
development will, in all cases, result in lower cost drugs.
Nevertheless, the discussion leaves open the possibility that
there are situations where open source drug development
might result in less costly drugs with the additional benefit of
leaving key drug development information available to other
licensees and innovators.
A. DEVELOPMENT COSTS
The discussion in Section IV above, suggested that it is
possible that drug development costs be reduced. However, the
amount of cost reduction, and whether it is enough to
significantly lower prices for purchasers, is uncertain. If the

world”).
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compound being developed is in-licensed under open source
terms, costs relating to licensing for that compound at that
stage of development would be minimal (i.e., an open source
license is generally non-exclusive and royalty-free). The caveat,
of course, is that to the extent non-open source
molecules/compounds need to be licensed into the development
process (which raises the specter of IP complications, as
discussed above), there could still be significant costs
associated with licensing.
There is also a potential for some cost savings at the front
end if the drug development is carried out under a virtual
pharma model as discussed above, as the need for personnel
and overhead may be somewhat reduced. These savings are
hard to quantify without knowing the specific needs of the
development program in question.
Even with this potential for cost savings, it is important to
recognize that the main drivers of drug development costs will
exist for open source drug development as well. These include
the cost of maintaining GXP compliant laboratories and
undertaking pre-clinical studies, which can individually range
into the hundreds of thousands of dollars. The costs of clinical
trials often range into the millions of dollars and added to that
are costs related to preparing a regulatory package.149 If
successful there will be additional expenses related to
establishing manufacturing capacity, testing and distribution
of products. Ultimately, while the cost per molecule may not be
the $800 million claimed by industry, it will still be significant
and require extensive capital resources.
B. PRICE COMPETITION
The second prong of presumed lower costs for drugs
developed through open source drug development is that they
will be subject to greater competition in the marketplace and
hence, prices will be dramatically lower. Specifically, the claim
is that without the monopoly rights available to conventionally
developed drugs, generic competition will be immediate and
will result in very low drug prices.
Conventionally,
pharmaceutical
companies
develop
compounds that are the subject of proprietary IP protection.
This allows the company a statutory monopoly on the approved

149. DiMasi et al., supra note 63, at 162 tbl. 1.
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product for some fixed period of time. Depending on the
country, the developer may have additional time tacked on to
the end of the patent life, either via a patent term extension of
half the time taken to get regulatory approval (e.g., under the
Hatch Waxman Act150 in the U.S. which grants the drug
developer an extension of the patent life of a product to make
up for the lengthy duration of drug approval, up to a maximum
period of 14 years of patent life plus patent term extension) or
via some kind of regulatory exclusivity.
Because open source licensed compounds are, by definition,
freely shared, an open source-licensed compound could be
licensed to multiple parties at the same time, and all of those
licensees could pursue drug development at the same time.
Alternatively, competitors could be free to access the open
source licensed compound post-approval to apply for generic
status at any time.151 That is, there would be no period of
exclusivity.
When considering the potential for generic (or any other
competition) to a pharmaceutical, it is important to remember
that for any drug product, regulatory approval is required prior
to marketing.152 Products cannot simply be placed on the
market. Thus, when speculating about increased competition,
one also has to consider the costs and incentives for getting to
market.
There are two routes for copies of a drug to come to market.
The first is that a second party can sponsor a full drug
development for the same molecule or compound under Section
505(b)(1) of the U.S. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act.153

150. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68b-68c, 70b (1994);
21 U.S.C. §§ 301 note, 355, 360cc (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994); 35 U.S.C. §§
156, 271, 282 (1994)).
151. As discussed above, the availability of the final product on OS terms
will depend on how other licenses interact with the OS license. It is possible
that a subsequent license could force an override of any OS provisions that
would share exclusively licensed IP.
152. Post-marketing changes are also heavily regulated. For example: for
example, notice to regulators has to be made for all changes in manufacturing,
safety information, drug interaction information and the like. Depending on
the type of change, approval by regulators must be obtained before doing it.
153. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2006); DONALD O. BEERS, GENERIC AND
INNOVATOR DRUGS: A GUIDE TO FDA APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS § 4.02, at 4–3
to 4–56 (6th ed. 2004).
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In the case of open source drug development, two parties could
presumably license the molecule or compound and do the
necessary studies for submission. This approach requires full
costs for each party.
The second avenue is as a generic version of the drug,
under an abbreviated drug approval process. Generic drugs
may be approved by regulators when the patent term and
relevant regulatory exclusivities have expired.154 Abbreviated
submissions generally require GXP compliant evidence of
bioequivalence, as well as evidence of manufacturing
capabilities. Generic manufacturers also have post-marketing
safety reporting obligations and are subject to similarly tight
controls on ingredient quality, sourcing, and other
manufacturing issues.155 While these requirements are
certainly not as extensive as those required for the first
approved reference drug, they do require that a sponsoring
company has specific capacities in the pharmaceutical sector.
Prices of drugs generally drop once a generic drug
competitor is introduced. The magnitude of the drop in prices is
a function of how much competition there is. The introduction
of a single generic, for example, generally only causes a price
drop of under 30%, while the price can drop more substantially
when there are multiple competitors.156 As a general rule,
pricing of generic drugs is a reflection of market competition—
or, in countries, where drug prices are regulated—of prices set
by relevant authorities.
Importantly, the potential for increased competition does
not per se guarantee that open source developed drugs will be
cheap. If only one entity takes the drug through to marketing
authorization, that entity will have a monopoly by default and
can set the prices per market rates—or per national pricing
authorities (or, of course, based on market access levels). At the
same time, it is possible that if the product is profitable or there
is a potentially large market for it, other competitors may come
on the market as generics. But it is also possible that the size of
the marketor any number of other factors including
availability of active ingredients, marketing costs, potential

154. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006).
155. 21 C.F.R. § 314.81 (2009).
156. See Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Brand Loyalty, Entry,
and Price Competition in Pharmaceuticals After the 1984 Drug Act, 35 J.L. &
ECON. 331, 336 (1992).
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liabilities or other factors—could make generic development
unattractive to other parties. There are numerous instances
where the brand company that initially obtained approval for a
drug remains the only manufacturer of that product despite the
expiration of patents.
Also, there can be considerable variation in the amount of
price reduction that results from generic entry. If the cost of
manufacturing remains high because of costs of ingredients or
processes, the end product is likely to be costly as well. Finally,
although it may appear natural to look to generic companies to
engage in open source drug development, that would be an
entirely new role for such companies. Generic companies
currently produce drugs that have already been proven safe
and effective, and such companies enter proven markets that
have years of history. In contrast, generic companies
attempting to develop a new drug that is open source based
would be taking on new risk much greater than they now face.
It is far from clear that many would do so.
C. POSSIBLE SCENARIOS?
It is possible that a philanthropic consortium dedicated to
improving access for a specific therapeutic area could fund an
open source drug development program with the aim of
developing the drug at low cost and seeding the field for generic
competition. If that organization chose a drug with a large
potential market, it is likely that a generic marketplace would
emerge for the drug. The program could be further supported
by making sure relevant manufacturing technology transfer
was also available to potential competitors.
The potential benefits of such a program are multi-faceted.
First, the consortium would be undertaking the significant
investment of developing a (needed) drug. It would be doing so
while allowing other researchers to continue using the relevant
compound, thus enabling the possibility of additional
innovation. Further, the consortium would be putting together
a package that others could rely on for abbreviated approvals to
make the same drug at potentially cheaper prices. It is possible
that the number of potential purchasers of generic versions of
the drug offers sufficient incentives to generic companies to
manufacture copies of the drug that would be sold for less. If
that happened, the consortium would, arguably, have created a
self-sustaining system for accessible drugs without, necessarily,
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having to invest in long term access for the drug. That said, the
consortium would still have had to invest the up front costs to
undertake drug development. In addition, there are questions
of scope and sustainability: given the large amount of resources
required, it is unclear how many such initiatives could be
undertaken and for how long.
Other scenarios that have been suggested are various
kinds of public-private partnerships and new types of
corporations that have explicit social requirements built into
their structure.157 An example of the latter is the Community
Interest Company (CIC), which was first enacted into law in
the United Kingdom in 2005.158 These corporations are
designed to appeal to investors who are willing to cap their
financial rewards on the grounds that the company is making a
significant, identifiable social contribution.159 So far, such
companies have not appeared in a significant way in the
biopharmaceutical sector, but it would seem that if the need to
maximize profits is somewhat offset by social goals, there is at
least in principle the possibility that such companies could offer
their products at lower cost and thus increase accessibility.
VI. INTERIM CONCLUSION: WHAT IS THE FUTURE OF
OPEN SOURCE DRUG DEVELOPMENT?
Conceptually, open source drug development is presented
as a route for ensuring that the open source-licensed IP related
to drug development remains available and for greater access
to healthcare products. However, as described in this article,
open source drug development would involve complex IP
relationships, a lengthy and expensive development process,
novel and potentially difficult management, staffing and
financing, while at best offering uncertain impacts on cost and
accessibility. It is difficult to imagine a system so encumbered
being widely adopted for drug development and it seems

157. I credit Ed Levy with developing this line of thought.
158. Community Interest Company Regulations 2005, S.I. 2005/1788
(U.K.).
159. Fraser Valley Centre for Social Enterprise, Analysis of L3C and CIC
Social Enterprise Models, http://www.centreforsocialenterprise.com/index.html
(follow “2. For a Centre document outlining the characteristics of the US and
UK legal models for social enterprise” hyperlink), at 5 (last visited, June 1,
2009);
see
also
List
of
Community
Interest
Companies,
http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/coSearch/companyList.shtml (last visited, Oct.
22, 2009).
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unlikely that a private company would be interested in taking
on such a process.
Despite these hurdles, the goals of open source drug
development remain worthy and should be the subject of
further discussion. In order to advance the conversation
further, this article closes with brief comments on: (1) whether
there are more targeted uses of open source that might be more
readily adopted, (2) whether additional incentives could
overcome some of the hurdles identified and spur adoption of
open source practices in drug development, and finally (3)
whether there are alternative pathways to the goals underlying
open source drug development.
A. DIAGNOSTICS AS A POTENTIAL MODEL AREA FOR OPEN
SOURCE DEVELOPMENT

Diagnostics are tools which indicate the presence or
absence of a disease or potential treatment possibilities for a
certain type of disease. 160 Such tools are increasingly prevalent
with the emergence of personalized medicine, which aims for
targeted use of therapeutic products.
Currently, in the U.S. laboratory-developed diagnostic
assays161—those assays for which a blood, urine, or DNA (or
other) sample is sent away to a lab for analysis (as opposed to a
kit sold on the market)—are not subject to the same standards
of regulation as drugs or biologics. In fact, at present in the
U.S., such assays must only be compliant with standards that
require that there is analytic validity, meaning that the tests
must yield the same results each time.162 There is no pre-

160. In-Vitro diagnostic is defined in 21 C.F.R. § 809.3 (2009).
161. A laboratory-developed assay is one developed by a clinical laboratory
for use only by that facility. Diagnostics are regulated as a subset of the
medical device category. See 21 U.S.C. §321(h) (2009). Therefore, diagnostics
are subject to a different regulatory regime than drugs and biologics. See, e.g.,
21 U.S.C. §360(c), (e). Laboratory-developed assays represent a very small
subset of the medical device, or diagnostic, categories. Nevertheless, they are
of particular interest for purposes of this discussion because of their uncertain
and shifting regulatory oversight.
162. The relevant standards in the U.S. are the Clinical Laboratory
Improvement Act (CLIA), Pub. L. No. 90–174, 81 Stat. 533, and related
regulations administered by the Department of Health and Human Services.
See 42 C.F.R. pt. 493 (2008). While CLIA establishes certain laboratory
standards, e.g., for certification, quality assurance, quality control and
personnel, it provides minimal standards for assessment of analytical validity
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market safety or efficacy review in a manner analogous to what
is required of drugs.163 Further, competitor tests can come on
the market with exactly the same minimal regulatory hurdle as
long as there is no proprietary position barring that entry.
There is no “generic” pathway or approval needed.
Despite this much less burdensome regulatory regime,
diagnostics can be very expensive and inaccessible because
patent exclusivity allows companies to charge monopoly
prices.164 Hypothetically, open source licensing of the
underlying IP could change this situation. If the underlying IP
were licensed out on open source terms, multiple parties could
develop the same or competitor diagnostic products and the
cost of such products should drop. Given the relatively low costs
of putting such diagnostics on the market in terms of
regulation, the potential revenue from charging parties to run
the assay may provide enough financial incentive for parties to
continue to develop the tests.
As discussed supra, the IP landscape on any given product
may be complex. If a diagnostic were based on a single open
source licensed patent, it too would be available on open source
terms. However, many diagnostic assays are algorithm based,
meaning that they rely on relationships between the presence
and activity of multiple genesand likely multiple patentsto
make probabilistic assessments about the likelihood of a
disease or condition. As explored in Section IV.A, above, it
would be difficult to establish open source licensing for all
relevant inputs and the interplay of open source and non-open
source licenses would likely be complex. This is, however, a
topic worth further exploration.
B. ADDITIONAL INCENTIVES
It may also be worth considering the introduction of
and no standards for the assessment of clinical validity (i.e. efficacy).
163. In the past several years, the FDA has been evaluating whether it
should change these practices and has issued a draft guidance proposed that
certain laboratory based diagnostic assays be subject to PreMarket Approval
(21 C.F.R. § 814), like certain other medical devices. See FDA, Draft Guidance
for Industry, Clinical Laboratories, and FDA Staff—In Vitro Diagnostic
Multivariate
Index
Assays,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceD
ocuments/ucm079148.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2010).
164. E. RICHARD GOLD & JULIA CARBONE, MYRIAD GENETICS: IN THE EYE
OF A POLICY STORM 25 (2008) , available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1260098
(follow “download” hyperlink).
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additional incentives to foster adoption of open source licensing
in the biomedical sciences. The rationale is that a greater
number of open source licenses increases access to information
overall and makes it easier to combine multiple licenses to
create an open source product.
For example, one could introduce a new form of data
exclusivity, administered by a regulator, that rewards drug
development of an open source licensed molecule, pathway or
process.165 In the short term, the data exclusivity would allow
the drug developer a certain fixed term of market monopoly, by
blocking others from relying on the approval data to file a
generic application. This would allow the drug developer a fixed
term to recoup some of its investment. The benefit of using data
exclusivity rather than a patent would be that the underlying
IP would remain under open source terms and available for use
by others in ongoing research and innovation.
A data exclusivity awarded to open source drug
development would stand in the way of price reductions due to
generic competition. However, after the course of the data
exclusivity, generics would also be able to rely on the original
submission to regulators in their abbreviated applications.
C. OTHER ALTERNATIVES TO ACHIEVE SIMILAR ENDS
Even as open source drug development continues to be
explored, it is worth considering other alternatives to achieve
similar ends. As discussed above, there are two potential coexisting aims for using open source in drug development,
namely: (1) to keep the knowledge inputs into drug
development available for use without IP barriers, and (2) to
make healthcare products less costly and more accessible.
With respect to the first goal, there are other potential
options to keeping material available to other researchers and
drug developers. For example, at present there exists a
“research exemption” from patent infringement available to
165. My colleague Ed Levy initially suggested this idea in the context of
open source to me. See also HOPE, supra note 9, at 215 (stating that exclusive
marketing rights obtained by FDA approval may provide “[sufficient] incentive
to induce commercial actors to engage in the more costly aspects of integration
while still not being a strong enough proprietary or quasi proprietary right to
deter upstream contributions”). For a discussion of the role of FDA
exclusivities on innovation, see Rebecca Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in
Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345 (2007).
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those using patented information for purely research, noncommercial ends.166 In recent years, courtsparticularly in the
U.S.have blurred the lines of this exemption and suggested
that any research that could potentially ultimately have
commercial uses, is outside the exemption.167 These decisions
have complicated reliance on a research exemption for
researchers. Simply clarifying and codifying a broad research
exemption through legislation could potentially go a long way
toward making patented information available to a wide base
for ongoing knowledge development. One can speculate as well
that reducing licensing costs for inputs to drug developmentif
applicablecould yield some reduction in the overall costs of
drug development. However, such cost reductions are likely to
be minimal in contrast to the required regulatory elements.
Another option, which may address both goals of open
source, is targeted use of patent pools. Patent pools aim to
make a certain set of intellectual property available in an effort
to overcome the potential of patent thickets or other IP blocks.
In a forthcoming article,168 my colleagues develop the argument
that patent pools might be used as a tool to promote open
science and access to information. In this context, it is worth
exploring further how patent pools may similarly make drug
development more accessible and less costly (with the same
caveat as above, that the costs of completing required
regulatory elements remains very high). GlaxoSmithKline
(GSK) recently announced that they would make certain
patents available publicly in a “pool” to promote development of
drugs for neglected diseases.169 While one could question

166. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006). To encourage development and expedite
the introduction of pharmaceuticals into the marketplace, Congress amended
the patent laws in 1984 to insulate drug research from charges of
infringement so long as such research is “solely for uses reasonably related to
the development and submission of information” to FDA. Thus, activities that
would otherwise constitute patent infringement noninfringing if they are
undertaken for the purpose of developing and submitting to the FDA
information necessary to obtain marketing approval for a new chemical entity,
a medical device, or a food additive.
167. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005);
Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Taken together, these
cases suggest that any research that has ultimate commercial aims does not
fall under the research exemption. The impact of these cases continues to be
the subject of legal discussion and interpretation.
168. Ed Levy et al., Patent Pools and Genomics: Navigating a Course to
Open Science?, 16 B.U. J. SCI & TECH L. 75 (2010)
169. Andrew Witty, CEO, GlaxoSmithKline, Speech to Harvard Medical
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whether the GSK arrangement fits the definition of a patent
pool, we think this variation should be explored further as a
potential avenue for furthering drug development in certain
areas. It may be that novel financing or tax tools, in
combination with some form or variation of patent pools,
provides an appropriate and workable path to less expensive
and more accessible drugs.
A third approach would be to develop licensing strategies
that permit greater access for certain usesfor example, for
drug development for neglected disease or use by those in the
developing world.170 The idea, again, is to reduce the
intellectual property costs associated with drug development in
an effort to reduce the cost and promote accessibility to the
resulting drug product.
In addition to these alternative approaches to intellectual
property, there are other novel mechanisms that could be
considered to reach similar goals. These could include novel
regulatory approaches that might streamline the regulatory
obligations in certain situations, alternative regulatory
incentives, and the potential for developing greater access to
abandoned drug development programs. Greater thought and
attention is needed in each of these areas.
The ultimate goal of making drugs less costly and more
accessible through the application of alternative IP regimes is a
good one. However, any such attempt is far from simple. The IP
landscape of drugs is highly complex and any attempt at
change must be weighed against a web of regulation and other
legal requirements. There is hope, however, that a carefully
considered combination of changes to IP, financingand
possibly regulationcan achieve the goal.

School: Big Pharma as a Catalyst for Change (Feb. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.gsk.com/media/Witty-Harvard-Speech-Summary.pdf.
170. See Jean O. Lanjouw, A New Global Patent Regime for Diseases: U.S.
and International Legal Issues, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 10611 (2002).

